

Conflict Identification: How Psychology Can Be Used to Identify Political Conflict

By:

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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

In the field of political science, conflict is a crucial area of concern. However, with a finite number of potential subjects, political science has been limited to very few theories surrounding conflict analysis. Alternatively, interpersonal psychology—working with a much larger population—has made tremendous strides in developing theories for interpersonal conflict analysis. The central claim of this study argues that political conflict analysis will be improved through the integration of behavioral psychoanalysis. To prove this theory, I will conduct a comparative case study examination using a single theory from psychology to identify the stimulus of World War II. The mode of analysis is the victim perpetrator model of interpersonal conflict, and the subjects are the Treaty of Versailles and the Franco Prussian War of 1870. Ultimately, this research will identify the Treaty of Versailles as the catalyst for World War II — and prove that behavioral psychology should be applied to political conflict identification.

DEDICATION

To my mother, Virginia Flamenco,
and girlfriend, Kimberley Hart.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My journey to this point has seen chaos, tranquility, and everything in between. I would like to take a moment to offer my sincerest appreciation to those who have supported and inspired me along the way.

I would like to offer my gratitude San Diego State University and incredible staff along with the amazing student atmosphere that spark my interest for political science and psychology. I would like to give special thanks to Dr. Farid Abdel-Nour who uncovered my love for political theory, and supported my efforts to apply for graduate school.

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I could not be here without the love from my family. Not a day goes by where I do not miss being in San Diego with them. Thank you for supporting my decision to move across the country and pursue my dreams. Most I would like to express my deepest respect and love for my mother. Her strong work ethic and optimistic personality has taught me to fight for the things you want, and appreciate every moment of life.

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Interpersonal and political conflict has remained two disparate entities for the mere fact that one is among people and one is among political organisms. Ironically, however, the mechanisms used to identify, manage, resolve, and even prevent conflict within each of these fields are achieved in similar fashions. The purpose of this theory is to merge these two related subjects, and improve the procedures for creating and sustaining peaceful relations among political organisms by using theories from the field of psychology. This thesis will focus on validating that claim that behavioral psychology can be used to identify political conflict. To prove this theory I will break the concept down into digestible sections.

The first section will lay the theoretical framework. In a somewhat unconventional manner I am blending political psychology and international realism. To add to the uniqueness of I will be using an altered version of realism, and a specific subdivision of political psychology. When these two schools of thought are combined they can be misinterpreted for alternative renowned philosophies. With this in mind I have decided to include succinct explanations for how my framework differs from others.

Next, I will illuminate the similarities between conflict at the individual and international level. Because my theory merges these two separate levels of analysis a single definition for conflict must be established. To achieve this task I will examine various resources and present the characterizations for each. Once I highlight the parallels between the definitions I will converge them into a single interpretation.

This theory must also analogize the fundamental desires between individuals and political organisms. The most logical way I believe this can be done is by examining people in an anarchical state and comparing them to the current international system. Throughout history

many contract theorists have devised their own anarchical state, which has been coined 'the state of nature,' and postulated how individuals cohabited. Rather than strain the reader with a lengthy discourse over the various social contract theories, this thesis will give its sole attention to the most famous one that connected to realist thought, Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan*. A concise review of his theory will illuminate the cardinal desire responsible for human beings actions, and thus the creation of civil society.

Immediately after reviewing his theory I will offer my critiques, and construct my own social contract theory. The product will then be compared the arrangement of the contemporary international system. This will allow us to discern the resemblances between the two entities, and ultimately deduce that they share fundamental desires, which make them comparable.

After I determine that individuals and political organisms are in fact homologous, this thesis will discuss the mode in which psychology can identify political conflict. The method used is an historical case study analysis, where a single psychological principle will be used to identify the escalation of conflict to World War II. The historical cases to be analyzed are, the creation and affects of Treaty of Versailles, and the Franco Prussian War of 1870. The psychological model used will be the victim perpetrator relationship.

To simplify, I will demonstrate the validity of this theory by dissecting the idea it into smaller hypothesis. The first will concentrate on establishing the similarities between individuals and political organisms in order to determine the comparability of these two entities. The next will claim that political conflict follows the same pattern as interpersonal conflict. When these hypotheses hold true it will demonstrate that political conflict can indeed be identified through the use of psychological principles.

CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL APPROACH

The ideological structure of this theory is quite simple to understand. It is taking specific principles from political realism and fusing it with political psychology. To ensure that there is no uncertainty for the reader this section will broadly discuss both philosophies, and highlight the exact concepts that will be used. I will also present the political theories that I believe some readers could have the have the potential for mistaking my theoretical framework with. The competing theories observed will be liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism.

2.1 FRAMEWORK FOR THESIS

REALISM

The theory of political realism attempts to understand the motives of states by describing the world as it is. The core principles for realists are that the world exists under an anarchical condition, that states are the strongest and most important actors, actors self-interested and rational with a fundamental desire for survival, and that power is relative, or zero-sum. What exactly does this mean?

Anarchy is described as the absence of an overarching world government. In order for the global community to exit from the anarchical condition all states must yield to a central authority. Although there have been attempts to unify the international society many states resisted. This refusal degrades the integrity of the system on a holistic level because legitimacy relies on full participation.

Without a sovereign body to enforce formal laws the international community is governed by socially accepted norms. The absence of a central authority blurs the line between what is morally right and wrong, and creates insecurity among nations. Additionally, political actors are unsure who will respect the norms in the international arena and become concerned

with ensuring future survival. The lack of standardized laws will lead states to constantly engage in conflict, or prepare for possible conflict to perpetuate their existence.

According to realists power is zero-sum; if one actor experiences a gain, then a separate actor must experience a loss. This distribution of power creates an international status quo, which forces state to be concerned with how much power they have compared to other, possibly formidable, states. This development causes weaker states will form alliances to create collective power and balance against the stronger. Balancing is a technique explained in realist theory to prevent or remove power from threatening states. As states lose power their insecurity will increase, causing them to endeavor to regain authority. Stability of the status quo does not equal peace; rather, it means that there is a lack of conflict.

When states are unhappy with the status quo they will attempt to increase their relative power. However, the zero-sum nature of realism will lead states into the security dilemma. For example, if state A gains enough power to make state B highly insecure, then state B will attempt to rebalance. If state B balances back to the status quo or greater, then state A will become insecure and attempt to rebalance. The perpetual insecurity will cause the to countries to spiral into a perpetual competition for power.

Realism believes that anarchy causes a continual state of conflict for the international society. Since there is no supreme authority complete trust is impossible and rules are made by the stronger. In this perpetual state of war the desire for survival will lead states to form alliance and compete for power.

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY

Political psychology is much harder to define because it includes a wide variety of topics. Research conducted by Kristen Renwick Monroe, William Chiu, Adam Martin, and Bridgett

Portman in *What is Political Psychology* divide this school of thought into twelve areas of focus:

1) cognition and reasoning, 2) emotion, 3) identity, 4) international relations and intergroup conflict, 5) leaders and leadership, 6) mass movements, 7) organizations and groups, 8) personality, 9) philosophy of social science and epistemology, 10) political communication, 11) political culture and socialization, 12) and values, belief systems, ideology, and attitudes (Monroe et al 862). These categories were determined in 2009 by compiling all 911 political psychology publications, beginning with its inception in 1979.

Outside of the field, however, political psychology is most commonly described as research conducted to examine the relationship between individuals and their larger political systems. This can be examined in a couple of different ways. First, how individuals affect society, second, how society affects individuals. Both the individual and the type of society contain large amounts of variance.

For example, the cognitivist theory believes that the best way to understand a states decision-making is to focus on the leaders thought process. In *How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?* James G. Blight proclaims that, “Cognitivists believe the arms race is crazy because crazy people are running it” (Blight 627). Therefore, in the context of conflict, cognitivists would argue that war occurs because crazy people are in charge.

Political psychologists are also interested in determining correlations between individuals and voting. Researchers have examined this through numerous topics, which include emotion, identity, values, belief systems, ideology, etc. The applications for these findings range from increasing voter turn out to implementing successful campaign strategies.

However, what is most pertinent to this thesis is how political psychology is used to dissect the field of international relations. Two of the more common types of analysis are the

cognitivist theory, and the interactionist theory. The cognitivist theory places focus on studying the heads of states, and believes that crazy leader will create war. The interactionist theory assesses how behaviors lead to conflict, and believes that crazy actions lead to war. To an interactionist the best way to understand how state will act is by understanding behavior.

The broadness of political psychology leaves many people confused by the field. At its core political psychology attempt to use various psychological approaches to understand political science.

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY UNDER REALISM

My theory takes a unique approach to studying political conflict because it amends political realism by declaring that political organisms are the primary. I define a political organism as a collective group of people operating under a central authority. This includes but is not limited to countries, cities, international governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and terrorist groups. This adaptation differs from the recognized description of realism because it substitutes states with political organisms. Thus, my revised version of realism claims that the international community is anarchical, that political organisms are the primary actors, and that political organisms are rational self-interested beings that are constantly working to maintain their own survival.

My theory then blends this adapted version of international realism with the interactionist theory of political psychology. In addition, my philosophy uses Kenneth Waltz's levels of analysis and bridges the gap between the international and individual levels. That is, the variables that engender conflict on the individual level will also create conflict at the political level. For example, if conflict arises because Person A does X to Person B, my theory will assert that the same X variable cause the same affect at the political level. Conflict will arise because

Country A does X to Country B. More specifically, my theory will compare the similarities between political conflict and interpersonal conflict in order to determine that the psychological principles used to identify conflict amongst individuals can successfully be used to identify conflict in the political arena.

2.2 WHAT THE FRAMEWORK IS NOT

I do recognize that my theory could be misconstrued and categorized as a rival theory. This thesis does not intend to examine ways that psychology can be used to form institutions that will lead to peaceful relations. Instead, it operates under the notion that political organisms are motivated by their own self-interests to survive. To better understand the issues that I am addressing I will briefly discuss international liberalism, institutionalism, and constructivism.

LIBERALISM

International liberalism is a direct response to realism. This philosophy also views the world as anarchical, but disagrees that the lack of government will create a hostile global community. Instead liberalism focuses on freedoms and liberties, the role of organizations, and places high value on absolute gains. Ultimately, when states become interconnected cooperation is possible.

For liberalism organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are the most important actors. It is in states' best interest to become involved with an international organization because they establish strong trading partners, acquire goods that they are normally unable to manufacture, and ultimately increase their profits. Additionally, the increased interconnectedness adds to the groups collective power and results in absolute gains.

Absolute gains believe if one player wins then all the players win. Each state will attempt to help one another for the mutual benefits. Absolute gains sparks reciprocity among its members, which liberals believe leads to cooperation. Collaborative behavior becomes a norm, and institutes peaceful relations between members.

Like realism, liberalism asserts that the world is in a state of anarchy, but asserts that this lack of central authority will not lead to inevitable conflict. Liberalism stresses the importance of globalization and asserts that when states become unified under an organization peaceful interaction will flourish because they wish to maintain membership.

INSTITUTIONALISM

Institutionalism accepts theories of both realism and liberalism. Like realism they accept that the world is anarchical, actors are motivated by their own self-interest and material gains, and as uncertainty erupts it will spread through the global community. However, institutionalism is classified as more of a liberal theory because it believes that cooperation and peaceful relations can be achieved by establishing institutions of interconnectivity.

Institutionalism highlights liberal economic theory and democratic peace theory to explain the lack of conflict at the international level. Both of these theories create institutions that generate long-term trust, and therefore cooperation. The more that institutions become entrenched into the international political society the more efficient, profitable, and peaceful the world becomes.

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism does not fall under realist or liberal thought, instead it is used as an alternative. This type of framework is interested with the question, 'why do states act the way they act?' Constructivism, however, is not a theory itself and focuses on identifying the best

approach to this question rather than offering answers. It is really a form of analysis in and of itself.

Constructivism claims that state behavior can best be understood by examining sociological variables such as historical events, creeds, and norms. In her short piece *International Relations, Principal Theories* Ann-Marie Slaughter discusses how constructivism can be used in the international arena. "A focus on the social context in which international relations occur leads Constructivists to emphasize issues of identity and belief... The perception of friends and enemies, in-group and out-groups, fairness and justice all become key determinants of a State's behavior" (Slaughter). Although there are many different variables that constructivism believes affects state behavior the underlying motif is the belief that sociological aspects will lead to the best analysis.

THESIS FRAMEWORK

The structure of my theory has to possibility of being confused with the central points from the aforementioned theories. I would like to take a moment to discuss and resolve the areas of ambiguity.

First, in liberalism organizations are the primary actors. It would be incorrect to assume that because my theory places high important on organizations that they alone are the primary actors. My theory specifies that political organisms are of most importance, which organizations are apart of.

Second, that the world will become more peaceful by establishing social norms for political actors. Although my theory does stress the importance of norms, it only does so to recognize how political organisms will act. I do not believe that that creating norms will guarantee a path to peace. Rather, norms will offer clues for successful cohabitation.

Third, that full cooperation is possible. Although I do not declare that cooperation is impossible, it is simply outside of the scope of my argument. My theory is concerned with illuminating better ways to identify conflict within an anarchical society. We will see in the preceding chapter that conflict can arise from cooperative situation.

Finally, given the nature of the current global society I do not believe in true absolute gains. Only in specific situations where political organisms collaborate towards a shared objective are absolute gains possible. However, the international society is filled with self-interested individual organisms striving towards separate goals. My theory is not attempting to claim that every actor within the global community will benefit from the improvement of political conflict analysis. This thesis is only concerned with creating a means for political organisms to coexist.

My theory will stick to the realist framework as well as incorporate political psychology. The point is not to create a more peaceful world that every actor will collectively benefit from. It will instead remove disconnect between the individual and international levels of analysis and ultimately add techniques to the field of conflict analysis.

CHAPTER 3. IDENTIFYING CONFLICT

To prove that psychological principles can be used in political science for conflict analysis I will highlight the similarities in how each field describes conflict, and establish a single definition of conflict. Being that conflict within each of these schools of thought is extremely similar this will be a seamless task. To accomplish this I will separately examine the various ways that each of these spheres characterize conflict, and construct a concise description for each. Once a clear understanding of conflict in each subject has been presented I will call attention to their kinship and organize them into a single definition.

3.1 INTERPERSONAL CONFLICT

As it is, interpersonal conflict lacks a single concise definition. To fill this void I will examine the standard characterizations of interpersonal conflict in order to generate a comprehensive description. In *Mediating Interpersonal and Small Group Conflict* Cheryl Pickard offers a few definitions from leading psychologists, sociologists, and mediators as her foundation. I will use this same structure to generate my illustration of interpersonal conflict.

As the leader in conflict resolution in social psychology, Morton Deutsch laid the groundwork for explaining conflict. In *The Resolution of Conflict* he declared that conflict arises “whenever incompatible activities occur” (Deutsch 10, 1973). When differing ideas and goals begin to intermingle there is a strong likelihood that one, or more, will be cast aside. Conflict can be found in the process of determining which ideas or goals that should be disposed of, and therefore which one should be kept.

In *Interpersonal Conflict* Joyce Hocker and William Wilmot build on Deutsch’s definition. Conflict is “an expressed struggle between at least two interdependent parties who perceive incompatible goals, scarce resources, and interference from others in achieving their goals” (Hocker and Wilmot 21). Although Hocker and Wilmot’s description retains the premise that conflict develops as a result from a discerned incompatibility, they offer an extra stipulation, the requirement of two or more people.

Likewise, Charles Pavitt builds the idea of interpersonal conflict from Deutsch’s depiction. In *Small Group Communication: A Theoretical Approach* Pavitt declares that, “Deutsch felt that two people are interdependent when each can affect the other’s life-space and the field of forces within it” (Pavitt Chapter 4). A reciprocal relationship must be present for

interpersonal conflict to exist. One cannot be in an interpersonal conflict with someone whom they have never met and do not possess the potential to affect their actions.

The following two definitions are similar and should be examined in tandem. First, in *Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict* former president of the American Sociological Association, Lewis Coser, expressed that, "Conflict is a struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of conflicting parties are not only to gain the desired values but the neutralize injure or eliminate their rivals" (Coser 232). Similarly, sociologist Joseph Himes illustrates conflict as, "The purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and gain statues, power, resources and scarce values" (Himes 14). Both of these thinkers present conflict as a struggle, or a competition, in which the involved persons contest over tangible or intangible goods. Furthermore, the forced exercised by the competing parties will vary significantly, ranging from nullification to annihilation.

In addition to the four definitions Picard presents a valuable characteristic. "Conflict is the root of personal and social change and it is the medium through which problems can be aired and solutions found" (Picard 4). Conflict often carries a negative connotation, which Picard declaration helps to resolve.

Interpersonal conflict, then, is the disagreement between two or more people who are attempting to achieve a tangible or intangible objective. Competition can arise when the people involved are competing for the same objective, or when the success of one person directly leads to failure for the other. The amount of force a person generates is contingent on the situation and the persons involved, and further includes, but is not limited to, neutralizing, wounding, or

eradicating the opposing person. Finally, conflict does not always lead to an undesirable outcome; instead conflict may result in progress for the involved persons.

Interpersonal conflict, however, is not as simple as defined above. In *Interpersonal Conflict Management in Group Psychotherapy: An Integrative Perspective* Peter Felix Kellerman declares that, “interpersonal conflicts are rarely a case of one person being completely at fault and the other totally innocent” (Kellerman 8). In addition, in the article, *Education for a Peaceful World*, Morton Deutsch discusses how schools can incorporate conflict resolution to better equip children to create and maintain a peaceful world. Before explaining the techniques for conflict resolution he first asserts the various types of conflict. “There are three major types of conflict: zero-sum conflict (a pure win-lose conflict), the mixed-motive (both can win, both can lose, or one can win and the other lose), and the pure cooperative (both can win or both can lose)” (Deutsch 512, 1993). Psychologists examine these three types of conflicts and use matrices to determine how actions will affect outcomes, and if the outcomes will result in conflict. “Scientists who examine the implications of matrix games are called ‘game theorists.’ Game theorists make several assumptions about how people act in game situations” (Pavitt Chapter 4). In order to easily compare and contrast these three types of conflict this paper will first observe zero-sum conflict, then pure cooperative, and finally mixed-motive.

Of the three types of interpersonal conflict zero-sum is the most competitive. “In a competitive situation, if one reaches his or her own goal, the other is less likely to reach his or hers” (Pavitt Chapter 1). Zero-sum conflict is more extremely than just competition; it is viewed as all or nothing, and describes as win-lose situations. Persons involved in zero-sum conflict believe that the victor will be the person who most effectively uses power. They attempt “to amass, mobilize, and use the various resources of power in such a way that one can bring to

bear on the conflict more effective relevant power than one's adversary. If this is not possible in the initial area of conflict, one seeks to transform the arena of conflict into one in which one's effective power is greater than one's adversary's" (Deutsch 1995: 512). If the weaker party believes that they possess greater power in an alternative scenario, then they will attempt to change the arena to their benefit. Physical strength is one of the many uses of power, however, there are multiple alternatives. For example, a physically weaker individual may pursue legal action rather than brute force.

Zero-sum conflict has the highest probability of being the most destruct. "Very few conflicts are intrinsically win-lose conflicts, but if they are misperceived to be such, the parties involved are apt to engage in a competitive, destructive process of conflict resolution" (Deutsch 1995: 512). Deutsch believes that it is important to stay ahead of zero-sum conflicts by creating social norms or rules that discourages this behavior. However, if this form of conflict does breakout then it must be resolved quickly before it spirals out of control.

On the other hand, pure cooperative conflict arises in situations where two or more people are working together for the same outcome, or if one person's success is contingent on the success of the other. "If one reaches his or her goal, then the other is likely to reach his or her goal" (Pavitt). Conflict arises when the people involved either do not agree on the best course of action, or if success for one hinders the success for the other.

Finally, mixed-motive conflict includes zero-sum and pure cooperative. It is described as "both can win, both can lose, or one can win and the other lose" (Deutsch 512, 1993). Conflict is sparked when either one or all individuals lose. The most well renowned game-theory scenario is found in mixed motive conflict, and is called *the prisoner's dilemma game*. The basic objective of this game is to convince individuals apart of a group to give up valuable information about the

other members. For instance, person A and person B are arrested for co-committing a crime. The police will separate the two individuals and discuss their possible punishment. First, person A and B can refuse to offer information and suffer the same punishment; second, person A can volunteer incriminating information about person B in order to reduce or eliminate their punishment; or third, person B could offer information about person A, which would increase person A's punishment.

Prisoner's dilemma is a classic example of a mixed game because it can either be zero-sum or pure cooperative. If person A defects and provides information then they win while person B loses. Or, if both individuals cooperate with each other and decline to present information then they avoid suffering the most severe punishment.

To build of the previous definition, an interpersonal conflict involves two or more people attempting to reach a distinct outcome, and where, at minimum, one party is unsuccessful. Conflict can either be competition or cooperation, and is seldom a result of a single individual's actions. The type amount of power used will vary depending on the situation and individuals involved. Lastly, although interpersonal conflict will ensure that one party procures a loss, it is periodically the catalyst for future development.

3.2. POLITICAL CONFLICT

Similar to the observation of interpersonal conflict I will discuss various types of political conflicts and present comprehensive definition. This section will focus on inter- and intrastate conflict, and move to ethnic conflict. As we examine these various types of conflicts patterns will emerge that will allow us to create a single definition.

War has been described as the business for the state, aiming to increase its financial wealth, territory, and sometimes population. In his well-recognized writing, *On War*, Carl Von

Clausewitz elegantly declared that, “War is thus an act of force to compel out enemy to do our will... and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” (Clausewitz 75-77). War is a coercive way for states to change the actions of other organizations. The amount of strength that a state will use will fluctuate, but lacks limitation.

State warfare is either classified as internal or external, but otherwise retain the same characteristics. In *What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition* Nicholas Sambanis declares, “The main distinction...between civil (internal or intrastate) war and interstate or extrastate (colonial and imperial) war was the internality of the war to the territory of a sovereign state and the participation of the government as a combatant” (Sambanis 816). Since these two types of war being fundamentally identical, a definition for one will suffice for both. In *Resort to Arms* Melvin Small and Joel David Singer declares that civil war is “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropolis, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides” (Small and Singer 1982, 210). State warfare, then, occurs when two or organizations, one of which being ordered by a state authority, actively oppose one another on a sovereign territory.

Some types of conflict have the potential of rising within a state, or between states. For examples, ethnic conflict ensues between two separate ethnic groups regardless of their citizenship. In *Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict* David Lake and Donald Rothchild describe what causes ethnic conflict by first resolving common misconceptions and then presenting an accurate description of ethnic conflict.

Ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, “ancient hatreds” and centuries-old feuds, or the stresses of modern life within a global economy. Nor were ethnic passions, long bottled up by repressive communist regimes, simply uncorked by the end of the Cold war... Ethnic conflict is most often

caused by collective fear of the future. As groups begin to fear for their safety, dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence. (Lake and Rothchild 41)

Ethnic conflict will be sparked by when one group becomes insecure of their future survival, and engages in risky behavior in an attempt to restore the status quo, and ultimately regain power or security. Ethnic conflict is thus described as conflict that occurs between two or more ethnic societies competing in the same political and social region for authority and survival.

Political scientists have studied these types of conflicts, as well as numerous others, to predict the behavior of political organisms. The best way to anticipate conflict is to understand the particular variables that directly lead to conflict. Over the years research has been done that has uncovered steady patterns of interaction that will lead to conflict. We will specifically observe how competition and cooperation leads to political conflict.

Competition amongst political organisms sparks when two or more actors are attempting to obtain the same good or objective. When political actors believe that the good is indispensable, or indivisible, the situation becomes zero-sum. The involved parties will often use increased force because a win for the opponent would be a direct loss for them. Zero-sum conflict can be observed in the ongoing war between Israel and Palestine. The organizations believe that if the goods they are fighting for were to be divided amongst them then they would become worthless, making this an all or nothing situation.

Cooperation between political organisms has the potential to create conflict. For example, in the wake of World War I the global community worked together to generate a peace treaty. The stipulations were not beneficial for all parties and had a severe negative effect on Germany. When political actors are motivated by the same goals but disagree on the actions to achieving them conflict will arise.

Finally, political scientist use game theory as a way to foresee outcomes, and create future decisions. In *World Politics* Jerry Frieden, David Lake, and Kenneth Shultz declare that, “Game theory is a tool for analyzing strategic interactions... Among its earliest and most useful applications is to international politics” (Frieden et al 75). Since its inception game theory has been utilized in many social science fields, but was established in political science.

Although there are many factors that cause conflict, there are fundamental characteristics that comprise it. Political conflict involves two or more organisms that are endeavoring for a desired outcome. Conflict can be competitive or cooperative and occurs when at least one party is unable to achieve their goal, or if the achievement of a goal produces undesired affects. Each party will use the necessary force to ensure the survival of their group, and can conclude in total extermination.

3.3 COMPARISON OF CONFLICT

Interpersonal and political conflict shares striking similarities. They both accept that conflict requires a minimum of two parties, and that conflict can arise from competitive or cooperative situations. The amount of force used by each party can vary and does not contain a limit. Finally, within each field of study researchers attempt to predict behavior through the use of game theory.

CHAPTER 4. SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

To accurately compare interpersonal and international relations I will create an anarchical condition similar to the current international community’s. The framework I will use to accomplish this is the social contract theory from Thomas Hobbes’s *Leviathan*. Once I have offered an in depth depiction of his state of nature I will illustrate my own. The point of examining Hobbes’s theory is to arrive at the fundamental desires for the individual and for

larger political organisms, and highlight their parallels. This section should remove variables that attempt to differentiate the appetite of the individual from the appetite of the larger political organism. Once the desires for these two beings become indistinguishable this thesis will postulate the reality of peace, or at least a decrease of conflict, through two methods. The first will discuss the construction of an international government, where the overarching body establishes and mandates laws, and also promotes and maintains peace by placing supreme power in the hands of a sovereign entity. The second will address the more likely situation. That is, how to diminish conflict in the absence of a formal international government.

4.1 THOMAS HOBBS

Thomas Hobbes believed that he could accurately identify the human motives that act as the foundation for the construction of civil society. This section will focus on elucidating those motives by examining his social contract theory through his renowned works, *On the Citizen (De Cive)* and *Leviathan*. In these writings Hobbes hypothesized a scenario that sequentially leads humans from anarchy to modern society. The most pertinent aspects of Hobbes's theory are the conditions and motives that individuals possess in their natural state, and how the creation of society has diminished the undesirable circumstances. It is the dramatic decrease of unpleasant variables that allow cooperation and harmony to exist amongst people.

For social contract theorist, pre-society individuals are living in a state of nature. In this natural state people possessed little desire aside from nourishment, rest, and procreation. This state lacked authority and granted individuals ultimate freedom to pursue their appetite. "Nature hath given to *every one a right to all*. That is it was lawfull [sic] for every man in the bare state of nature...to doe what hee [sic] would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possesse [sic],

use, and enjoy all what he would or could get” (Hobbes 5-6, 2011). As long as the resources that were necessary to satisfy individual’s appetites remained abundant, conflict ceased.

Conversely, when individual’s desires became unfulfilled conflict would spark. Hobbes attributed the inability to assuage the natural person’s appetite to a scarcity in the desired good. It is, therefore, the shortage of a particular good that led people to compete, and caused the proliferation of conflict. Hobbes declared, “The most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth [sic] hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it” (Hobbes 5, 2011). As individual’s appetite increased to the point of being insatiable, conflict became inevitable.

Within the state of nature people lived in a lawless society, there were no rules that obligated individuals to respect one another. “Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of body, and mind... For as the strength of body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger as himself” (Hobbes 391, 2014). Equality dictated that all people were granted equal freedoms to harm one another. Those who possessed the greatest ability to inflict harm or influence behavior were recognized as the strongest.

Hobbes believed that the conjunction of glutinous appetites, the rise of scarcity, and the equal right to cause harm led to an unlivable world.

Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them with. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious buildings; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as required much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no

society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (Hobbes 392-393, 2014)

Ultimately, the result of the state of nature would prevent maturation and be completely destructive for all parties involved. The natural state was perpetual war, where men are either actively engaged in conflict, or preparing for the next one. Completed trust did not exist, and therefore alliances were just as dangerous as remaining independent. Individuals' chance at survival was precarious and defensive preparation seemed illogical. It was under these conditions that individuals were forced to control adverse variable if they wished to maintain their survival.

Being rational creatures, humans were guided by a natural law where survival was paramount. It is the need for security that was the initial catalyst for civil society. "The passions that incline men to peace, are fear of death; desire of such things as are necessary to the commodious living; and a hope by their industry" (Hobbes 393, 2014). The constant state of war produced the fear of death. The constant fear of death limited the goods that individuals could acquire. To remove themselves from this undesirable reality, individuals began to make peace agreements, or contracts.

Hobbes claimed people began to exit the state of nature through the increase in contracts. The single requirement for the contract was the abandonment of the right to harm one another. The members of the contract grew as the amount of people who desired peace increased. However, alliances such as this in the state of nature were worthless because complete trust did not exist; individuals needed to create trust. Hobbes believed that trust was established with the inception of a central power to uphold the sanctity of the contracts. Instead of surrendering their right to cause harm, individuals transferred this right to a sovereign.

The sovereign could either be a unitary person or a collective organization. The relationship of the collective whole of man and the sovereign is known as a covenant. This

relationship obligates the sovereign to preserve the purity of the contract among men. Since all men transferred their right to harm to the sovereign, the sovereign is the sole entity that possesses the legitimacy to create violence. This right can be exercised against internal contract breakers or against foreign forces.

Civil society is born when individuals enter into a peace agreement with one another, and a sovereign is established to protect the contract. As the decrease of violence becomes discernable individuals are said to have exited the state nature. An exit of the state of nature does not create a utopian society where harm and hatred is eradicated. The birth of civil society requires that people refrain from provoking conflict. If conflict is sparks then individuals may protect themselves by using the right to harm.

Hobbes believes that in the state of nature the savage man was motivated by appetite and possessed the right to inflict harm. As appetite increase and scarcity become introduced conflict become intensified. Out of the fear of death, individuals did not wish to remain within these harsh conditions and formed peace contracts ensure their existence. Within the state of nature the desire for survival was the core motivation for the creation of civil society.

4.2 REVISED SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

Living in an era where the global community still operations within formal anarchy, this generation is granted with the opportunity to examine first hand the state of nature among political organisms. This section will use Hobbes's social contract as the foundation to examine the natural conditions of the international community. I will orchestrate a similar sequence to Hobbes's theory, where we observe the interactions between political organizations and locate their core desires. This illumination of the core desire will help us understand why political organisms act the way they do, and postulate about the future of the global society. This will be

accomplished through my altered version of the realist lens, which specifies that the international community lacks an overarching government, where larger political organisms are the focal actor, and their central desire is to increase their security and survive.

Political organisms, in a more natural state, desired expansion of territory and influence. As a political organism's appetite became unsatisfied it engage in activities to mitigate it. This can be observed throughout history when states sent imperial and colonial forces abroad. The growth of nations as well as the promotion of ideology is a common theme as political organisms became more technologically adept. In the modern era it is less acceptable to seize territory. States have had to adapt and adopted new forms of expansion, neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism. Neo-imperialism is the acceptable way that involves less physical force to annex territory. Neo-colonialism uses institutions to gain power over specific countries or regions.

In the absence of formal rule political organisms have been given the ability to act as they please, so long as they are able to resist the opposition of the international community. In situations where a country may be crossing the boundaries it is the will of the strongest that is dominant. This type of situations creates a world where the strongest make the rules and cooperation is less likely.

The situation described of above is what drives our contemporary international community. Each country holds at least a small bit of uncertainty of the future despite the superiority of their armed forces. Each political organism retains the equal right to harm one another. Since there is no limit to the amount of force political organisms can use it leaves political organisms fearful of their own future, and motivates them to increase both their defensive and offensive forces.

It is the constant state of fear that encourages actors to seek peace and attempt to cooperate. Without a guarantee that other political organisms will continue to remain non-combative, political actors create alliances to increase their security. Alliances are established with entities that political actors believe offer the greatest benefits with the least potential for harm. The reality, however, is that the international society lacks a sovereign authority to maintain peaceful relations and hold political organism accountable for their actions. This fact impedes on the opportunity for full trust, and perpetuates fear.

These cooperative actions are the first step towards the creation of a civil international society and the exit of the state of nature for political organisms. Similar to Hobbes's social contract theory, I believe that a sovereign body is required for political organisms to feel safe renouncing their right to cause harm. In the absence of a supreme authority political actors will continue to fabricate alliances that possess high degrees of insecurity. The rise in alliances allows us to discern that the paramount desire for political organisms is survival. Even though political actors calculate the risk involved in entering into an alliance they do so in order to perpetuate their existence.

It should be made clear that my theory does believe that the existence of an international governing system will be established in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is improbable for the global community to take action in forming an international civil society immediately, but in the long run necessary. To understand the importance of a formal international government this thesis will present a few flaws of a leading pseudo-governance theory, democratic peace theory.

Democratic peace theory is a liberal philosophy that attempts to explain the decrease in war within modern history. The claim is that long-standing democracies do not enter into warlike relations with one another. The framework for this idea asserts that states have become more

peaceful as a result of the growing interconnected in the international community through a similar governing ideology.

The likelihood of the failure of the democratic peace theory can be observed through a few examples. First, since long-standing democracies have not challenged each other this theory is unable to address how democracies will respond to a rise in interdemocratic conflict. Second, it is arguable that democratic peace theory is only successful because it is operating as an in-group versus an out-group. As more countries become long-standing democracies, and therefore become in-groups, they will diminish the battle against out-group mentality. If democratizations continue there will become a point when democracies possess little out-groups, and will begin to differentiate amongst one another. Discrimination will lead to conflict. Third, and potentially the most dangerous, is scarcity. Each of these points will be examined in more detail below.

Hypothetically, if conflict sparks amongst democracies they possess the ability to be the most destructive. In modern society, some of the more wealthy and militarily equip political organisms are democracies. The lack of conflict between democracies could be due to the fear of the power each different democracy retains. The recognition of mutually assured destruction could be at the heart of the issues. If conflict is to erupt between democracies then it has the potential be devastating to the parties involved, as well as members of the international community.

The other possible scenario is that the success of democratic peace theory could depend on the differentiation between democracies and non-democracies, or in-group versus out-group mentality. Democracies may feel a kinship amongst one another and be less prone to engage in conflict. As an increase in democracies occurs this kinship will decrease. As more democracies exist they may find a way to separate one another and create a path towards conflict.

What I believe is the most likely way that the democratic peace theory will fail is due to an increase in scarcity. As political organisms begin to deplete resources and resource insufficiency proliferates actors will begin to be motivated for their most important desire, their desire to survive. The less developed and less wealthy political organisms will feel most insecure and be the first to engage in risky decisions because of their limited options. This scenario will be a tinderbox, ready to ignite at the first sign of conflict.

The rise of a global sovereign will be a result of the conflict between the powerful and established political organisms. As peace becomes disrupted on a continual basis then each organization will begin to feel insecure of their own future. This fear will be the principal motivation for the establishment of an international civil society.

As previously stated, the probability that the international community will come together under a single authority in the near future is optimistic at best. Since this is the case we must learn to improve our international relations within anarchical conditions. I believe that the best possibility is to institute a system that better identifies, manages, resolves, and resists conflict.

The basic desire of political organisms is survival. When fear becomes a variable and a political organism believes that their chance for survival has decreased then conflict will begin to ensue. The global society has attempted to prove that as the world has becomes more interconnected political organisms are less likely to use conflict. However true this may be for the moment it is unlikely to remain indefinitely.

At some point a political organism, whether it be a country or a terrorist group, will disrupt the peace to the point of no return. It is speculated that this will occur as scarcity increases and political organisms have no choice but to battle over goods. With the lack of a sovereign authority to maintain the peace, and prevent actions that are undesirable for peace and

survival, political organisms will act as they deem necessary to survive when presented with grave danger. At some point an overarching government will be necessary to maintain peace and security within the global community. In the mean time the international community need to learn how to identify conflict so we can better manage, resolve, and prevent it from happening. Furthermore, as we learn how to identify conflict we must, as an international organization, learn to diminish the risk of the rise of scarcity.

4.3 INDIVIDUAL VS. INTERNATIONAL

This section has illuminated striking similarities between the fundamental desires between individuals and political organisms. Within conditions of anarchy each is motivated by their central desire for survival. Both will attempted to increase their relative power, and become insecure when power is decreased.

CHAPTER 5. METHOD

The previous chapters have determined that the individual and international levels define conflict through the same characteristics, and that the primary actors are motivated by the same core desire. Given that these two variables are equal, it is reasonable to use theories from the individual level and apply them to the international level. To prove this theory I will be using a comparative case study approach to determine that psychological principles are an affective tool for identifying conflict between political organisms. My data sources are academic journals, news publications, and historical literature. The subjects used are two historical accounts of war and war-post relations to identify the cause of World War II. The modes of analysis are characterizations of conflict determined by opposing parties. These variables can be observed through a nuanced understanding of the victim perpetrator relationship.

5.1 VICTIM PERPETRATOR RELATIONSHIP

The victim perpetrator model of conflict is a theory that describes the characteristics for a specific type of interpersonal conflict. This is a common type of conflict between people. In this model one individual suppresses their anger to a breaking point. Once their anger has reached its limit the person elicit a strong, often aggressive, reaction. It is this type of conflict that I believe is prevalent in the political realm.

This victim perpetrator model identified the distinct ways that conflict is depicted conflict from both a victim's and perpetrator's point of view. "In many episodes involving anger, the central theme conforms to a pattern in which one person (the perpetrator) offends, provokes, or otherwise angers a second person (the victim). The basic idea behind the present investigation was to obtain first-person accounts of such incidents and to compare victim and perpetrator perspectives" (Baumeister et. al. 994). Researchers asked 63 undergraduate psychology students to recall and transcribe story two separate story; (1), when they a victim, and (2), when they were a perpetrator.

The instructions for the "victim" story were as follows: "Describe an incident in which someone angered you, that is, an occurrence in which someone provoked you or made you really angry or mad. Nearly everyone has experienced such things more than once; please choose an especially important and memorable event"... The perpetrator instructions substituted the phrase "you angered someone else" for "someone angered you" and was identical in other respects. (Baumeister et. al. 997)

Researchers believed that using personal narratives, or micronarratives, would help control variance in observation interpretation.

The findings revealed a constant split among the victim and perpetrator accounts. Victims described the event as occurring over a longer period of time, with lasting ramifications, which included "continuing harm, loss, and grievance" (Baumeister et. al. 994). Furthermore, victims

perceived perpetrator's actions as impulsive and unreasoned. Victims attempted to restrain their anger over an extended period, and ultimately reacted to the continuous provocations.

Perpetrators, on the other hand, described the event as an "isolated incident that did not have lasting implications" (Baumeister et. al. 994). They did not view their actions as repeated offensive interactions. Instead, perpetrators reported that their actions were non-combative and well reasoned. Further, perpetrators were confused taken back by the victims reactions and characterized their behavior as irrational and excessive.

The victim perpetrator study teaches an important lesson about how a single conflict is viewed as noticeably dissimilar depending on the perspective. "Victims and perpetrators exhibit important differences in their accounts of conflict and anger. It appears that neither group is inclined to take note of these differences, and so unrecognized discrepancies in interpretation may be an important factor in the genesis of anger" (Baumeister et. al.1003-1004). Using a third-party to mediate and in these situation would allow each party to feel more represented, and come to better resolutions. However, third-party mediation is no always achievable. Therefore, to better and more quickly resolve conflict it is imperative for all of the parties involved to assess the situation from the opposing viewpoint.

The case studies will be observed in regressive chronology beginning with the Treaty of Versailles and moving to the Franco Prussian War of 1870. The first case study will focus on the stipulations placed on Germany in the aftermath of WWI, and the following interactions that led to WWII. Additionally, the first case study will illuminate France's desire for revenge against Germany, and demonstrate that it resulted in extreme provisions in the Treaty of Versailles. The second case study will observe the France Prussian War in order to identify the root of the lingering animosity from France towards Germany.

CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

This section contains two historical cases with an analysis following each. The analysis will use the victim perpetrator model above to prove that psychological models can identify conflict between political organisms. The case studies will be observed in regressive chronology beginning with the Treaty of Versailles and moving to the Franco Prussian War of 1870. The first case study will focus on the stipulations placed on Germany in the aftermath of WWI, and the following interactions that led to WWII. Additionally, the first case study will illuminate France's desire for revenge against Germany, and demonstrate that it resulted in extreme provisions in the Treaty of Versailles. The second case study will observe the Franco Prussian War in order to identify the root of the lingering animosity from France towards Germany.

This section contains two hypotheses. For the first case study, the Treaty of Versailles, the hypothesis is as follows: The harsh actions taken by the Allied Powers, particularly France and Great Britain, towards Germany in drafting the Treaty of Versailles will display the victim perpetrator relationship, where the Allied Powers are the perpetrator and Germany is the victim, and can explain the progression to World War II. The second case study attempted to trace the hostility leading to WWII back before WWI. The first case study will explain that France's motives in drafting the Treaty of Versailles originated from the embarrassment faced in the Franco Prussian War of 1870. Therefore, the hypothesis for the second case study will be as follows: The collapse of the second French empire was due to an ongoing conflict with Germany, which should mimic the victim perpetrator relationship, where Germany is the perpetrator and France is the victim, and therefore explain the extreme measures taken by France in the Treaty of Versailles.

6.1 TREATY OF VERSAILLES

At the end of the First World War the global community gathered in Paris to hold a peace conference that would attempt to stabilize power and promote long-term peace. The most significant document produced during this conference was the Treaty of Versailles. In the chapter “Versailles, Treats of” from *Europe Since 1941*, John Merriman and Jay Winter present a concise and accurate definition of this historic text. “The Treaty of Versailles is the popular name for the peace treaty with Germany after World War I that was signed on 28 June 1919 in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of France’s former Bourbon monarchy, located in the city of Versailles near Paris” (Merriman and Winter 2633). The parties that partook in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles were the victors of World War I, the Allied powers. Additionally, in an attempt to punish the perceived war provocateur, the Allied Powers exclude Germany from negotiations and required that they ratify the treaty (BBC).

At the beginning of 1919 the international community sent delegates to Paris to discuss peace and the aftermath of World War I. “Representatives of the twenty-seven countries that had declared war on Germany converged on the city of Paris in January 1919 to draft a peace treaty for presentation to representatives of the newly established German Republic” (Merriman and Winter 2633). However, the convergence of the countries was merely a façade because leaders of four countries drafted the peace treaty. Merriman and Winter explain the true creation of the Treaty of Versailles:

The real work was done in top-secret meetings of the two highest ranking representatives of the five countries whose military forces had defeated the German Empire—the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan. When this so-called Council of Ten proved too unwieldy for efficient decision making, the heads of government of the four major powers represented at the conference—President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, and Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy—began meeting in Wilson’s apartment as the

Council of Four. It was in these intimate gathering, during which the “Big Four” received a steady stream of supplicants from various countries and interest groups, that the most important decisions about the political future of Europe were reached. (Merriman and Winter 2633)

As a result, the treaty’s stipulations catered to the desires of the ‘Big Four.’ Two of the countries apart of the Big Four, France and Great Britain, retained bias opinions towards Germany from extraneous variables.

Premier Clemenceau was seeking vengeance for the past interactions between Germany and France (BBC). The result of the Franco Prussian War, which will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent analysis, decreased France’s territory and collapsed their empire. Great Britain, on the other hand, lacked the retribution of France and attempted to weaken Germany due to an insecurity of the future.

Accustom to possessing the supreme Naval and imperial powers, Great Britain wanted was motivated to do two things. First, limit the strength of the German military in order to regain some of their international power. Second, diminish Germany’s imperial empire and reclaim their global influence.

The agree upon stipulations for the Treaty of Versailles ordered a breakup of German territory, placed restrictions of the size our their armed forces, and required that they pay for destruction due to war. “The three most important (and controversial) provisions of the Versailles Treaty were its territorial, military, and financial clauses” (Merriman and Winter 2634). In addition, the Allied Powers offered an alternative to the large financial obligation Germany would be facing. If Germany accepted full responsibility as the war agitator then their total debt would be decreased.

The first of the stipulations was a direct attempt to diminish Germany’s regional and imperial power. The peace treaty called for self-determination, which allowed countries to

establish their own types of government in order to avoid the larger powers dividing regional territory amongst themselves. The problem, however, arose when smaller countries attempted to coalesce with the German state. “The hallowed Wilsonian principle of national self-determination paradoxically seemed to dictate that Germany...be rewarded for its aggression in 1914 and its defeat four years later by becoming much larger, richer, and more populous through the acquisition of neighboring territory that was inhabited by German-speaking people” (Merriman and Winter 2635). In the end the Allied powers remained firm and resisted countries’ requests to join Germany. They argued that it was in the best interest of the bordering countries’ futures.

When it came to imperial territory “the victorious allies had originally intended to divide up among themselves the German colonial possessions that their armies had conquered” (Merriman and Winter 2636). President Woodrow Wilson successfully persuaded the “Big Four” to rethink this decision. Although Germany’s imperial territory was distributed among the international community, the severity was to a lesser degree than originally intended.

In addition to territory, the Treaty of Versailles placed restrictions on the German armed forces. “One of the major objectives of the peace conference was to prevent the revival of German military power, which was widely blamed for instigating the recent war. Of the four great powers that dominated the decision-making process, France was the one that was most insistent on this point” (Merriman and Winter 2636). Even after France acquired some of Germany’s former territory, they remained insecure of their large population. France’s insecurity was a large motivation from the Allied Powers, not to mention Great Britain’s desire to recover their armed forces supremacy. The variables led to the heavy reduction of Germany’s military.

Arguably the most important situation was found in the financial obligations that were imposed on Germany. “France and the other countries on whose territories the war had been fought demanded that Germany— which had surrendered before any of its territory was invaded by Allied forces—finance the reparation of the extensive damage its armies had caused” (Merriman and Winter 2637). Britain also participated in collecting monetary retribution and demanded that Germany contribute to pensions and other societal conditions affected by war.

The leaders drafting the treaty understood the reality of Germany’s ability to repay these debts and established a clause that would allow them to pay less. “Recognizing that Germany would never be able to pay the entire cost of the war, the peacemakers decided to adopt an American proposal that affirmed Germany’s theoretical responsibility for the entire cost of the war but restricted the actual payment to compensation for all of the damage done to the civilian population and to an amount that was within its capacity to pay” (Merriman and Winter 2637-2638). Proposed as a favorable alternative, the decrease in total debt due Germany’s acknowledgment of the ‘theoretical responsibility’ of war was of minimal assistance. In fact, the reduction still left enormous payments for Germany. This revised settlement was optimistic at best, and ultimately the coup de grâce because it overtly and excessively humiliated Germany and left them with an absurd financial obligation.

Left with little choice Germany was unhappily signed the Treaty of Versailles. “When the finished treaty was finally presented to the German representatives on 7 May, they bitterly denounced the alleged harshness and unfairness of its provisions. Ordered to accept the treaty under the threat of an Allied military advance toward Berlin, the German government gave in and agreed to sign” (Merriman and Winter 2633-2634). Objectively observing the situation it is easy to sympathize with Germany because of the severity of the treaty.

The argument has been made that the Treaty of Versailles was not excessive, and that Adolf Hitler would have still rose to power. The following quote is long, but does an accurate job quickly combatting each of the criticized sections of the treaty.

[The Treaty of Versailles] was much less harsh and vindictive than the territorial settlement at the end of the next European war, when millions of Germans were expelled from their ancestral lands as Poland and Czechoslovakia simply reclaimed the German-inhabited territory they had acquired at Versailles. The military provisions of the Versailles Treaty hardly imposed a crushing burden on the defeated power. On the contrary, they were violated with impunity, beginning in 1921 when the Weimar Republic concluded a secret arrangement with Bolshevik Russia whereby the German army could evade the prying eyes of the inter-Allied inspection team by secretly testing proscribed weapons deep in Russian territory. The reparations bill that was finally submitted to Germany in the spring of 1921 was much lower than the fantastic sums bandied about at the peace conference. (Merriman and Winter 2638)

This counterpoint, however, is flawed for two reasons. First, it compares Germany's territorial stipulations at the end of WWI and WWII. The root of this inaccuracy is obligation Germany had to take fault. As observed above, the main reason Germany accepted responsibility as the belligerent for WWI was because of the financial opportunity it had to gain. Many German's were resentful of this acceptance and did not agree with the decision makers. At the end of WWII Germany felt more compelled to accept blame as the war provocateur. Second, the argument is only observing the immediate affects of the Treaty of Versailles. The ramifications from the treaty generated a long-term negative impact on Germany, which can be discerned by observing the situation holistically.

6.1.1 THE AFTERMATH OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

Following Treaty of Versailles Germany experienced a tumultuous decade. The observation of this epoch will offer strong evidence to support the fact that the treaty was in fact the beginning of the path to WWII. It is not to say that the ratification was the point of no return, but rather, to identify the point in time that caused the disastrous events that followed.

The German population was angry about the treaty for multiple reasons. First, they had been deceived into a vulnerable state and then taken advantage of. Prior to the creation of the treaty, German leaders were forced out of office to express their sincerity for peace. In November of 1918, Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and was ultimately exiled from Germany. The measures were taken as a direct result of the Allied Powers asking for a renunciation of German leaders during WWI. "Under pressure from the French and British, President Wilson informs the German government that armistice negotiations cannot ensue with the current military or Imperial war leaders still in place. An outraged Gen. Erich Ludendorff then disavows the negotiations as 'unconditional surrender' and is forced to resign by the Kaiser" (Gazette 6). WWI came to a halt in the months preceding the resignations of German leaders. The hope was that this cooperation would be the first step towards long-standing peace, however the stipulations placed on them seemed incongruent.

Second, the stipulations expressed in the Treaty of Versailles were viewed as disproportionate. Declared the United Kingdom's *National Archives*, "It is not hard to see why Germans were outraged. Germany lost 10% of its land, all its overseas colonies, 12.5% of its population, 16% of its coal and 48% of its iron industry" (National Archives). This indignation caused many riots in Germany in protest of the treaty. Furthermore, the German populace lost respect for their leaders and brought down the credibility of their entire government.

In addition to the anger expressed by its people, the Germany's economy suffered multiple catastrophic setbacks. Although directly prior to the signing of the treaty Germany's foreign trading was at a high, however it was not enough to finance their post war payments. As time passed and their debt increase, Germany's economic bubble eventually burst.

The progression of Germany's economic downfall can be observed from the early years of their payments to the London Settlement. The London Settlement, described by John Maynard Keynes in *A Revision of the Treaty*, was "The settlement of Reparations communicated to Germany by the Allied Powers on May 5, 1921, and accepted a few days later, constitutes the definitive scheme under the Treaty according to which Germany for the next two generations is to discharge her liabilities" (Keynes 64). This agreement is only referers to the sum of money that Germany was required to pay to Great Britain under the Treaty of Versailles and does not account for the financial obligation it retained with France.

In spite of the thriving Germany economy immediately following WWI, the German government was unable to meet their payments to the London Settlement. Declared by John H. Williams in *German Foreign Trade and the Reparation Payments*, "In order to meet even the relatively moderate terms of the London Settlement, Germany's exports in those eight months would have needed to exceed her imports by almost 2,000,000,000 gold marks. But, in fact, the imports exceeded the exports by 557,000,000 gold marks. For months, therefore, before the German government announced in December [1921] that it could not meet the January and February payments of this year, the complete breakdown of the plan announced to the world last May as a final solution of the reparations problem was seen to be inevitable" (Williams 484). It seemed apparent that the global community well was aware that Germany would be unable to continue making their payments and chose to let them fail. This account signifies one of the first of many situations of Germany's ongoing struggle to post war existence.

As Germany was unable to manage their payments they also had to oppose international confrontation. In 1923 France began its occupation of the Ruhr basin. This piece as land was significant because, according to Nicholas Roosevelt of *Foreign Affairs*, "It is the heart of

Germany's industrial system" (Roosevelt). As Germany responded to French occupation, France announced that it did not intend to annex the territory, but would remain until they received their payments (Roosevelt).

Left with little options Germany began borrowing money from the United State to combat their hyperinflation. "The Crash had a devastating impact on the American economy but because America had propped up the Weimar Republic with huge loans in 1924 (the Dawes Plan) and in 1929 (the Young Plan), what happened to the American economy had to impact the Weimar Republic's economy" (Weimar Republic and the Great Depression). The already badly beaten German economy was unable to hold on and joined the United States in a downward financial spiral.

6.1.2 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES CONCLUSION

Although a defense can be made that the conditions from the Treaty of Versailles were necessary and did not produce lasting negative affects it is clear that those arguments lack depths and are ultimately flawed. The punishment that the Big Four placed on Germany through the Treaty of Versailles was excessive and created from personal biases. France's desire for retribution, along with Great Britain's growing physical and imperial insecurity was two of the leading factors in the stipulations place on Germany. It is clear that the Treaty of Versailles was drafted with the intent to punish Germany and make it difficult for them to regain power, and ultimately succeeded. The lasting negative affects of this ongoing conflict led the German populace to be accepting of Adolf Hitler and the risky military situation he spark, which inevitably created World War II.

6.2 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES ANALYSIS

This analysis will attempt to prove that the historical case study above, the fallout from the Treaty of Versailles, follows the victim perpetrator scenario. This analysis will identify Germany as the victim and the Allied Powers as the perpetrators. Additionally, this section will be dissected into three segments, the victim's point of view, the perpetrator's point of view, and an objective conclusion.

As a reminder, the victim should describe the scenario as occurring over a long period of time with lasting ramifications. The victim describes itself as the party that is attempting to restrain the anger, but ultimately reacts to the ongoing provocations. Furthermore, the victim views their actions as rational, whereas the perpetrator is regarded as irrational. On the other hand, the perpetrator views the conflict as isolated without lasting affects. The perpetrator believes that their actions were well reasoned. When the victim responds the perpetrator describes the actions as an illogical outburst.

GERMANY:

Overview: Towards the end of WWI the German populace took action to remove the German leadership that the Allied Powers believed instigated the initial conflict and perpetuated it. Not surprising, the German government was not invited to Paris to establish a peace treaty, however, their agreement was required. In order to reassert their sincerity for peace, the German government ratified the treaty and attempted to hold up their end of the bargain. As time passed the conditions of the treaty eroded the German state until its collapse. Seeing no other option, Germany took bellicose action in order to ensure its survival.

Irrational Perpetrator: The German populous was unhappy with the severity of the Treaty of Versailles, especially after the hostile leadership had been removed from power.

Furthermore, the stipulations in the treaty were viewed as harsh as well as humiliating.

Open Conflict: The ramifications of the Treaty of Versailles were long lasting, and this was by no means a closed conflict. Although the German export economy was initially booming post WWI, the revenue generated combined with the post war debt resulted in a massive deficit. In the early 1920s the German economy experience hyperinflation, and crashed due to the Great Depression. In addition, Germany struggled with debt collectors in the form of foreign military occupation. Since the punishments from the treaty seemed to be never ending, the resentment that the German state felt towards the Allied Powers increases, which negatively affected their future relationship.

Resisting Aggression: In an attempt to remain peaceful Germany attempted to abide by the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles for over a decade. When they were unable to generate enough revenue to meet the post war payments they obtained foreign loans. Furthermore, when France seemed to be acting aggressive in the occupation of the Ruhr basin they did not engage in first strike conflict.

Reactions: As the German population suffered through a decade of economic chaos and personal disgrace they ultimately lost faith in their government. The consequence was the election of leaders that would improve the German state and put an end to their hardship through any means necessary.

THE ALLIED POWERS

Creation: The leaders of four of the leading countries came together to establish a plan that would hinder future conflict of that magnitude. The Allied Powers viewed Germany as the

responsible party, and believed that if conflict was to spark again they would be the sources. In order to hinder this future from happening and punish Germany accordingly the Big Four drafted the Treaty of Versailles. This document called for the diminishment of their empire, economy, and armed forces. The recognized the severity of the economic stipulations and therefore reduced the total punishment so long as Germany accept full responsibility.

Closed Conflict: These stipulations put on Germany were viewed as controlled and the Allied Powers did not believe that they would generate future resentment. The Allied Powers would not alter the agreement in order to perpetually punish Germany, rather, they would allow them to accept their punishment and eventually rebuild.

Well Reasoned Actions: The Allied Powers attempted to create a punishment that was harsh without crossing a moral line. The loss of territory and decrease of armed forces was actually rebalancing the international status quo back to its prior state. In addition, the initial repayment package was acknowledged as unreasonable, and was decreased.

Irrational Overreaction: The creation was WWII was a disproportionate from Germany. The Allied powers did not see strong connections between the state of Germany and the stipulations that had been placed on them a decade before. Instead, the world was going through a deep collective depression. Ultimately, Germany was creating a war that the Allied Powers believed the Treaty of Versailles would help stop.

No harm to future relations: The security that the Allied Powers gained from the Treaty of Versailles did not cause them to question if their relationship with Germany was damaged. The international community did not strictly enforce the diminishment of the German armed forces. France and Great Britain were tolerant towards Germany's inability to repay their

post war debt. And the United States supported the Germany economy by granting them loans.

Conclusion: The victim perpetrator model fits the actions leading to WWII because Germany, as the victim, was affected by the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles over a prolonged period of time. The requirements of the treaty were viewed, by Germany, as unjustifiably harsh. After WWI, Germany continuously attempted to restrict itself from resorting to aggression.

Unfortunately their efforts were unsuccessful and they eventually succumbed to the ongoing provocations. Additionally, Germany believed that their resulting actions were justified because they were left no other option. If they continued to abide by the treaty they would fall into a deeper depression and witness the annihilation of their population.

Conversely, the Allied Powers, or perpetrators, believed that the provisions of the treaty were necessary to resist future action from the hostile German state. The treaty was not intended to be altered after its ratification, and would thus cease to exist after the specified timeframe had passed. Finally, the Allied Powers described the resulting conflict, WWII, as an extreme outburst to an unfavorable situation.

6.3. THE FRANCO PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870

In the 1860s Prussian forces moved through Austria and Germany, expanded their power, and proliferated European insecurity. The country most affected by these actions was France. This review will observe the actions take by the diplomatic leaders and countries, as detailed in Geoffrey Wawro's *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871*, in order to identify the causes the Franco Prussian War of 1870. Additionally, this review will investigate the resulting collapse of the France's second empire in order to determine if there was any lasting hostility that contributed to future conflict.

CAUSES

In the mid-1860s the Prussian empire, led by General Helmuth von Moltke, retained steady growth that contributed to the rebalancing of international power in Europe. “In a matter of days, Prussia climbed from the lower rungs of great power (‘Prussia unaided would not keep the Rhine or the Vistula for a month,’ *The Times* of London had scoffed just six years earlier) to the top, gaining 7 million subjects and 1,300 square miles of territory. Tired of sharing Germany with Austria, of ‘plowing the same disputed acre,’ [Otto von] Bismarck now controlled most of it, and was poised to take the rest” (Wawro 16). As France distantly watched Bismarck and the Prussian increase their power, Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon III, began to engage in a series of strategic action because he believed conflict would be inevitable.

With much of its army occupying foreign territory, France was heavily outnumbered by the advancing Prussian Army. “Infantry companies in France had been drawn down to less than half their usual strength, netting Louis-Napoleon scarcely 100,000 war-ready troops... Prussia’s army, flush with victory, was three times larger” (Wawro 18). Lucky for France Bismarck had the Prussian army busy in Austria and Germany.

As Prussia continued to grow at an unexpected rate, France feared that Bismarck would be ready to engage in conflict earlier than expected, and thus began to restructure its approach. “France gaped in astonishment. Almost overnight a rather small and manageable neighbor had become an industrial and military colossus” (Wawro 17). Napoleon III believed that while Prussia was distracted in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 that he could lead to capitalize on unoccupied territories.

Prussia, however, defeated the Austrians in a mere seven weeks. This quick triumph not only ruined Napoleon’s plans, but it humiliated him, as he had publicly boasted of his campaigns

for French expansion. Nevertheless, Napoleon engaged in territorial exchanges and attempted to “acquire the German fortress town of Luxembourg in 1867... Yet Bismarck refused even the partial payment” (Wawro 18). Napoleon, facing further disgrace began receiving criticism from his administration, particularly Adolphe Thiers.

These sorts of interactions continued through the decade. Prussia continued to expand, and France remained a step behind growing increasingly insecure. The closer Prussia moved to France, the more illogical Napoleon became. “The image of France on a hair-trigger was certainly apt, for the emperor’s finger lay heavy on the trigger by the late 1860s” (Wawro 20). Of course Napoleon’s insecurity did not only stem from the rising international tension.

Being the self-proclaimed emperor added to Napoleon’s neurosis.

Louis-Napoleon was a troubled man, who, as the popularly elected president of France in 1851, had over- thrown the French Republic and crowned himself Napoleon III, Emperor of the French. At first the Napoleonic *coup* had been welcomed. Unfortunately, that Napoleonic *coup* of 1851, launched in the name of “order” and “popular welfare” when memories of the bloody revolution of 1848 were still fresh in people’s minds, seemed ancient history to many Frenchmen by the late 1860s. (Wawro 20)

Still cleaning the remnants of France’s internal conflict, a large external conflict would potentially be devastating to Napoleon’s rule. He was unsure how his people would respond. Would they stand with him, or was this the beginning of the end?

As the war preparation lasted for nearly half a decade it became apparent to the Prussian empire that their best chance for success was to continue to prolong the conflict. In France “faith was dwindling fast, for the Second Empire was sagging by the late 1860s. Now in his sixties, Napoleon III was stooped, fat, tired, and chronically ill” (Wawro 25). Strategic diplomacy was a war of attrition in itself. The Prussian leaders attempted to find the best opportunity to strike.

Fortunate for them Napoleon was becoming more anxious than them, and in 1870 he believed that his best possible salvation was to engage in conflict.

In 1870 the Franco Prussian war finally began due to a few separate actions. First, in an attempt to unify the region, King Wilhelm I would become the German Kaiser. This news was “dynamite in the ears of Napoleon III. A united Germany would tower over France” (Wawro 32). Second, General Bismarck, strategically, discussed publically two things; one new railway that would cut through Switzerland, and second he alluded to an alliance with Italy in the near future. Bismarck’s speech was meant to create fear in France and help push them to war. “As intended, the speech ignited the French legislature where angry deputies insisted that the emperor draw the line with Bismarck” (Wawro 32). Finally, there were discussions of a coronation for Prince Leopold von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the nephew of the Prussian King, to the Spanish Throne. “Working patiently for the war with France that might unite the German states, Bismarck saw in the unfolding Spanish crown question another useful provocation. If he could slip Leopold on to the Spanish throne before Napoleon III could react, the emperor would be deeply compromised” (Wawro 34). As predicted this evoked the French government and ultimately triggered warfare.

THE END AND AFTERMATH OF WAR

The war itself took a devastating toll on the French Society. “In Paris, the quality of life was plummeting every day. The city of 2 million had eaten up most of its food stocks and now faced famine” (Wawro 276). It was clear that the French government had inaccurately accounted for the conditions. Additionally, the war itself was more or less controlled by the Prussian army.

As the war raged the Prussians continued to win battles and eventually unified under one Germany nationality. “There was more despair on 18 January [1871], when the German princes

gathered in the Palace of Versailles to proclaim 'the unity of the German nation' under their newly fledged *Kaiser* or Emperor, King Wilhelm I of Prussia. The ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors was calculated to humiliate France, the Versailles palace and *salle des glaces* having been constructed 200 years earlier by Louis XIV, whose military campaigns had shattered Germany into the impotent statelets that were only now being unified by Bismarck" (Wawro 282). Although there were measures taken to humiliate the French state during war, the German forces did not wish to continually antagonize France long after war ended.

When the conflict ended, and France was left in ruins, German leaders helped reignite a French government. "Part of Bismarck's plan to end the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 required prompt French elections, to return the expected majority for *peace* that everyone in France... fervently desired. Under Bismarck's protection, elections for a national assembly were held in French and German-occupied France on 8 February [1871]" (Wawro 303). The French peoples quickly took hold of Paris and expelled German military occupants. In the end, France was bitter by the loss war and loss of territory, and vowed to reclaim what was once theirs.

CONCLUSION

A rebalancing of power within Europe sparked the Franco Prussian War of 1870. In the 1860s Prussia believed that they could unify the Austrian and German states and quickly began to move through the region. Neighboring countries, such as France, became insecure of this action because they feared a potential loss of power and influence. Napoleon III took strategic measures to prevent this from happening, but consistently struggled to keep up with General Bismarck's army. Conflict ultimately began through a series of strategic traps that Bismarck has placed. Once conflict had begun it was clear that France remained behind, and ultimately the newly unified Germans who were victorious.

It should be noted that France's desire for conflict was comparably equal to Prussia's, relative to European society as a whole. It was previously asserted that Bismarck had performed actions that embarrassed Napoleon III. However, it was Napoleon's miscalculations that were ultimately responsible for his chagrin, rather than malicious displays from Bismarck.

Finally, although the aftermath of the conflict was substantial, the severity in which Germany punished France was minimal. In fact, Germany seemed to be happy with their newly acquired power and became less offensive. It was France, feeling that they had been humiliated, that retained strong bellicose feelings and kept a keen eye for revenge. It can be argued that it was France's desire for retribution that was a key variable for lasting hostility and future conflict, as opposed to continuous abusive action from Germany.

6.4 THE FRANCO PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870 ANALYSIS

This analysis will attempt to demonstrate that the historical case study above, the Franco Prussian War and collapse of the second French empire, follows the victim perpetrator scenario. This analysis will identify France as the victim and Germany, or the Prussians, as the perpetrators. Additionally, in this section will be dissected into three segments, the victim's point of view, the perpetrator's point of view, and an objective conclusion.

As a reminder, the victim should describe the scenario as occurring over a long period of time with lasting ramifications. The victim describes itself as the party that is attempting to restrain the anger, but ultimately reacts to the ongoing provocations. Furthermore, the victim views their actions as rational, whereas the perpetrator is regarded as irrational. On the other hand, the perpetrator views the conflict as isolated without lasting effects. The perpetrator believes that their actions were well reasoned. When the victim responds the perpetrator describes the actions as an illogical outburst.

FRANCE

Creation: Witnessing the Prussian army disrupt the European balance of power, France became insecure of a loss of authority, and believed that conflict was inevitable. Napoleon, as advised by his legislation took strategic measures to prepare for war with Prussia. When war did ignite Germany came out victorious. The result caused a collapse of the second French empire, and established a desire for revenge and a retrieval of power and territory lost.

Irrational Perpetrator: Nowhere in the case study does evidence suggest that France viewed Prussia's actions as irrational. On the contrary, France discerned a logical progression and attempted to combat it.

Open Conflict: After the conflict had ceased the French state did not view the conflict as ongoing, but rather retained aggressive feelings.

Resisting Aggression: There was no resistance of aggression from France. As conflict approached Napoleon actively attempted to engage in conflict. After the war had ended there were no signs of continued provocation from the German state.

Reaction: In the years following the Franco Prussian war France did not engage in large conflict with Germany. It was not until WWI that France and Germany reengage in large conflict. It is important to note that WWI seen as a result of Germany belligerence. France did not seek the first strike offensive diplomacy until the drafting of Treaty of Versailles.

PRUSSIA/GERMANY:

Creation: In an attempt to unify the region Prussia waged a series of war that resulted in a rebalance of power that favored the newly formulated German empire. Additionally, the

desire to be a supreme power in Europe caused Prussia to take tactical action against the powerful French state.

Closed conflict: After the termination of the Franco Prussian War, Germany did not continue large scale attacks against the ruined French state.

Well-Reasoned Actions: The Prussian actions were extremely well reasoned. As a result Napoleon and the French government committed numerous blunders.

Irrational Overreaction: The Prussian/German government did not view irrational overreactions immediately because France did not take action. However, when the French did take diplomatic measures in the Treaty of Versailles it was viewed as disproportionate.

No harm to future relations: The German state could most likely discern the negative implications that the war had to future relations. France, losing power and territory, was right to desire vengeance.

Conclusion: The historical case study of the Franco Prussian War of 1870 does not follow the victim perpetrator relationship. France was not continuously victimized by the victorious German state. In fact, France did not attempt to avoid conflict and was equally responsible for engaging for war. In addition, the humility suffered by the French government was due to frequent errors in preparation for war. The vengeance that France was after, and eventually capitalized on with the Treaty of Versailles, cannot be justified through the victim perpetrator relationship.

CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION

This thesis is concerned with creating a new approach for identifying political conflict by blending international realism and political psychology. The conditions for which it uses realism

remains similar to traditional realist theory, with a minor twist. The international community lacks a single agreed upon governing power, where political organisms are the focal actors, and each actor's main desire to increase their likelihood for survival. The difference between my version of realism and the commonly accepted version is that my version substitutes states with political organisms. A political organism is described as, but not limited to, a country, a city, international governmental organization, nongovernment governmental organization, or terrorist group.

The way in which this thesis uses psychology is through behavioral psychoanalytics, or more simply the interactionist theory. Interactionists believe that conflict is generated through irrational behaviors, and that these behaviors are discernable within interpersonal life. Therefore, my theory states that, political scientists studying conflict would benefit greatly from acquiring a strong foundation of psychoanalytical principles used to identify conflict. Observing an historical case study, and using a psychological principle to identify specifically where, how, and why conflict was generated, validates this theory.

However, to first demonstrate that the analysis is possible, this thesis proved two essential variables were equal. First, that interpersonal conflict and political conflict were comparable. We found that the similarities for the definitions of conflict between the two fields are almost indistinguishable.

Interpersonal conflict, which exists among individuals, can be defined as a situation comprising two or more people where there is at least one losing party. Conflict can spark from competitive or cooperative scenarios, and is rarely generated from the actions of one person. The degree of force varies on the situation and individuals who partake, and has the potential to result

in complete annihilation of all parties involved. Finally, interpersonal conflict can be destructive and or constructive.

Political conflict focuses on the interaction between political organisms. It is defined as a scenario that involves two or more actors that are working towards a desired outcome where at least one party fails. Political conflict can be competitive or cooperative, and is often a result of more than one party's actions. Political conflict has the potential to be lethal for all groups involved. Rarely does political conflict lead to complete destruction; therefore it often forces actors to learn to cohabit in a more peaceful way.

The second variables the fundamental desires for individuals and political organisms. By observing each entity in its natural state we were able to determine that their underlying desire were the same. Each is motivated by the aspiration for perpetuating their existence.

Since each of these variables are equal between the individual and international level, we can predict that conflict will arise from the same type scenarios. To test this hypothesis we used a model from behavioral psychology to analyses the beginning of an historical conflict.

The psychological model used was the victim perpetrator relationship. This theory declares that a scenario involving two or more parties, one of which being victimized, and the other acting a perpetrator to the victim, will result in the victimized party aggressively lashing out against the perpetrator. Furthermore, this principle asserts that a victim will view the conflict as open, where the actions of the perpetrator were unwarranted and excessive, and that their own reaction was due to the habitual provocations of the perpetrator. The perpetrator on the other hand, consistently describes the conflict as an isolated incident, does not believe that their actions were provoking, and that the victims response was an overreaction.

The historical cases studies we used as subjects to be analyzed were, the Treaty of Versailles, and the Franco Prussian War of 1870. The purpose was to identify the at least one of the conflicts as the catalyst for World War II.

When analyzing the end of WWI and the Treaty of Versailles, the events that followed were congruent with the victim perpetrator relationship. This analysis determined that, the stipulations placed on Germany from the Treaty of Versailles victimized them for the subsequent decade. They were unable to escape the stigmatism of being the belligerent party of WWI, and continuously battled with their collapsing economy until it inevitably burst due to the Wall Street crash of 1929.

This research also articulates that the actions conducted by the Allied Powers, particularly France and Great Britain, in the Treaty of Versailles and the decade that followed defines them as the perpetrator in the situation. The Allied Powers believed this to be an isolated situation, where they were engaging in well-reasoned actions, and that Germany's response, being the beginning of WWII, was an overreaction. In an attempt to trace the origins the hostility that led to WWII back further, this thesis observed the Franco Prussian War of 1870 in order to determine if France had also been victimized, and thus yearned for vengeance.

The analysis of the second case study concluded that the Franco Prussian War and its resulting action did not display the same qualities of the victim perpetrator relationship. Although France did seem to hold on to aggression, it was not due to continuous provocations where they attempted to restrain their anger. In fact, France partook in war preparation, as was ultimately less prepared than the Prussian/German forces.

Now that the entire thesis has been reiterated, I will discuss first, how and why the former case study validates my theory, and second, how and why the latter case study does not

invalidate my theory. In addition, I will also show how the latter case study supports my theory.

In order to declare that the first case study is congruent with my theory, it is important to revisit the hypothesis: The harsh actions taken by the Allied Powers, particularly France and Great Britain, towards Germany in drafting the Treaty of Versailles will display the victim perpetrator relationship, where the Allied Powers are the perpetrator and Germany is the victim, and can explain the progression to WWII. The analysis above asserts that the actions from Germany and the Allied Powers did match that of the victim perpetrator example. This suggests that if the victim perpetrator model had already been discovered then at least two possible course of action could have resulted. First, if that the diplomats drafting the Treaty of Versailles were aware of the victim perpetrator model then they could have identified that the actions they were taking were ultimately perpetuating conflict. Or, second, if the Treaty of Versailles was drafted exactly the same, that political psychologists could have identified that it was creating a victim perpetrator relationship, and worked to repair the situation before it resulted in conflict.

They hypothesis of the second case study declared: the collapse of the second French empire was due to an ongoing conflict with Germany, which should mimic the victim perpetrator relationship, where Germany is the perpetrator and France is the victim, and therefore explain the extreme measures taken by France in the Treaty of Versailles. The results of this analysis were negative for the reasons highlighted above. However, this does not discredit my entire theory because the theory does not state that they political conflict can be identified through the victim perpetrator model. Rather, it offers support for the larger theory. All political conflicts will fit distinct patterns. To improve political conflict analysis political scientists must know what type

of conflict they are dealing with. Models from behavioral psychology will allow political scientists to determine what type of conflict they are dealing with.

CHAPTER 8. FURTHER RESEARCH

This thesis has covered a small fraction of the larger research I intend to conduct. The larger goal is to use psychoanalytical models to advise on conflict management, resolution, and prevention. The immediate next step for this theory is to retest political conflict identification using an alternative psychological model. When this holds true I will take the same approach to demonstrate the validity of this theory within political conflict management, resolution, and prevention.

The prerequisites for continued research are to enrich my knowledge of both psychology and history. First, as I gain a stronger understanding of psychology I will have a better idea of what theories can be applied to the political arena. Next, it is essential that I discern specific events that would be used to prove my hypotheses. The beauty of this approach is that political conflict can be observed and better understood within a safe and controlled environment.

It would be unwise and dangerous to manipulate variables with the intent of creating conflict between political organisms in order to conduct research. By using interpersonal psychology as the foundation for research on political conflict the hazardous conditions subside. At the individual level researchers easily create repeatable conditions to test hypotheses and establish theories on interpersonal conflict with zero ramifications to the global society. Once a theory on interpersonal conflict has been validated it can be applied to the international level through the same comparative case study analysis that this thesis used. This is an intelligent approach that at most contains minimal risk and will leverage enormous gains in knowledge to the field of political conflict.

It should be noted that future research does not have to be contented to the international level. This theory can be applied to social conflict, such as class warfare or race. Within our modern society it is easy to discern the rising tension between these social groups. Using the victim perpetrator we can predict that the parties that have been repetitively marginalized will eventually react in an extreme manner. If our political leaders are able to recognize this pattern than future conflict can be avoided.

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

This thesis took the initial step towards bridging the gap between the individual and international levels of analysis. The central claim is that the international level can use psychological principles to identify political conflict. To prove this theory, I focused on two foundational variables found at the individual and international levels, and set them equal to one another. The two variables were, the definition of conflict, and basic desire. The ideological framework used was a combination of interpersonal psychology and political realism. The methodological approach was a specific behavioral psychoanalysis to identify the root of conflict in two historical case studies. A nuanced understanding of the victim perpetrator relationship from psychology effectively identified the Treaty of Versailles as the catalyst for World War II. The stipulations created in the treaty caused Germany to feel oppressed and ultimately elicited a strong reaction.

Although this thesis has focused on only one section of political conflict analysis, it offers a robust structure for further research. To validate the larger theory, future research must replicate the steps provided in this thesis and examine conflict management, resolution, and prevention. The entire school of political conflict analysis will benefit greatly by broadening its scope and incorporating psychological principles.

Finally, my theory is beneficial for society because it offers political organisms new tools for avoid conflict. When conflict is identified at its core, leaders can take the appropriate steps to prevent escalation. This theory will not proliferate peace, but rather, act as an additional instrument for political organisms to use in order to maintain survival within the conditions of global anarchy.

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